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Abstract—We consider concave continuous-kernel games char-
acterized by monotonicity properties and propose discounted mir-
ror descent-type dynamics. We introduce two classes of dynam-
ics whereby the associated mirror map is constructed based on
a strongly convex or a Legendre regularizer. Depending on the
properties of the regularizer, we show that these new dynamics
can converge asymptotically in concave games with monotone
(negative) pseudo-gradient. Furthermore, we show that when the
regularizer enjoys strong convexity, the resulting dynamics can
converge even in games with hypo-monotone (negative) pseudo-
gradient, which corresponds to a shortage of monotonicity.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the earliest works on solving continuous-kernel concave
games is the work of Rosen [29]. The continuous-time gradient type
dynamics was shown to converge to the Nash equilibrium in games
that satisfy a so-called diagonally strictly concave condition, roughly
equivalent to the pseudo-gradient being a strictly monotone operator.
Recently, research on solving monotone games has seen a surge. Both
continuous-time dynamics and discrete-time algorithms have been de-
veloped, mostly for games with strictly (strongly) monotone pseudo-
gradient. For (non-strictly) monotone only games, no continuous-
time dynamics exist. Discrete-time algorithms have been proposed,
based on either proximal regularization, [28], inexact proximal best-
response, [17] or Tikhonov type regularization, [19], and recently
extended to generalized Nash equilibrium, e.g. [20], [21]. All these
works are done in a discrete-time setting and the dynamics evolve in
the primal space of decision variables (and possibly multipliers). With
the exception of [19], these algorithms are applicable only in games
with “cheap” (inexpensive) proximal/resolvent evaluation, [28].
In this note we propose a family of continuous-time discounted
mirror descent dynamics, whereby the dynamics evolves in the space
of dual (pseudo-gradient) variables. The mapping from the dual back
to the primal space of decision variables is done via a mirror map,
constructed based on two general classes of regularizers. Depending
on the properties of the regularizer, we show that these dynamics
can converge asymptotically in merely monotone, and even hypo-
monotone, concave games. To the best of our knowledge, these are the
first such dynamics in the literature. Our novel contributions consist
in relating the convergence of the dynamics to the properties of the
convex conjugate of the regularizer.
Literature review: Mirror descent algorithms have found numerous
applications in recent years, e.g. in distributed optimization [2], online
learning [4], and variational inequality problems [5]. They fall into the
class of so-called primal-dual algorithms; the name mirror descent
refers to the two iterative steps: a mapping of the primal variable
into a dual space (in the sense of convex conjugate), followed by
a mapping of the dual variable, or some post-processing of it, back
into the primal space via a mirror map. The mirror descent algorithm
(MDA) introduced by Nemrovskii and Yudin [1], was originally
proposed as a generalization of projected gradient descent (PGD) for
constrained optimization. The authors of [31] have shown that MDA
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possesses better rate of convergence as compared to the PGD, which
makes it especially suitable for large-scale optimization problems.
Other types of algorithms can be seen as equivalent to or special
cases of MDA, e.g. dual averaging [3] and follow-the-leader [4]. A
continuous-time version of MDA, referred to as the mirror descent
(MD) dynamics, [12], [15], captures many existing continuous-time
dynamics as special cases, such as the gradient flow [12], [15], saddle-
point dynamics [9] and pseudo-gradient dynamics [10].
In the context of multi-agent games, mirror descent-like algorithms
have been applied to continuous-kernel games [13], finite-games
[6], [7], and population games. The primal space is taken to be
the space of decisions/strategies, and the dual space is the space
of payoff vectors (in finite games) or pseudo-gradient vectors (in
continuous-kernel games). Zhou et al. [13] introduced the concept of
variationally stable concave game and showed that, under variational
stability, the iterates of an online MDA converge to the set of
Nash equilibria, whenever the step-size is slowly vanishing step-
size sequence and that the mirror map satisfies a Fenchel coupling
conforming condition [13]. Since all concave games with strictly
monotone pseudo-gradient are variationally stable concave games,
therefore the algorithm converges in all strictly monotone games.
However, there are games with a (unique) Nash equilibrium that is
not necessarily variationally stable, e.g. zero-sum (monotone) games.
While finding the Nash equilibrium of strictly monotone games is an
important problem, convergence in such games does not necessarily
imply convergence in monotone (but not strictly monotone) games.
Contributions: Motivated by the above, in this work we propose
two classes of continuos-time discounted MD dynamics for concave,
continuous-kernel games. The discounting is performed on the dual
step of the mirror descent, which generates a weighted-aggregation
effect similar to the dynamics studied for finite-action games in [7].
Discounting is known to foster convergence and eliminate cycling in
games, as shown in monotone games or zero-sum games [7], [24].
By exploiting properties of the mirror map in the two classes as well
as the discounting effect, we show that these dynamics converge
asymptotically to the perturbed equilibria of concave games with
monotone (not necessarily strictly monotone) pseudo-gradient. Under
certain conditions, they can even converge in concave games with
hypo-monotone pseudo-gradient. To the best of our knowledge, these
are the first such results. Our convergence analysis uses a Lyapunov
function given by a Bregman divergence. We note that recently [32]
identified the Bregman divergence as a natural Lyapunov candidate
for a variety of systems, elegantly tying with existing results on
mirror descent dynamics [12]. While the dynamics are in the dual
space as in [7], herein we consider continuous-kernel games rather
than finite-action games. Furthermore, compared to [7] we set up a
general framework in terms of two classes of regularizers, matched
to the geometry of the action set. For either strongly convex or Leg-
endre regularizers, we provide convergence guarantees in monotone
(hypo-monotone) games and present several example discounted MD
dynamics. In fact, one such example recovers the dynamics in [7] if
the action set is specialized to a simplex geometry and the regularizer
taken as a particular entropy example. Another example dynamics can
be seen as the continuous-time dual counterpart to the discrete-time
Tikhonov (primal) regularization, [19]. Compared to the undiscounted
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2MD [13], our discounted MD dynamics can converge in (not strictly)
monotone games, and even in hypo-monotone games. A short version
will appear in [39], with two example dynamics. Here we propose
two general classes, present proofs (omitted from [39]), additional
example dynamics and numerical results.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide
preliminary background. Section III presents the problem setup and
introduces a general form of the discounted mirror descent (DMD)
dynamics. In Section IV, we construct two classes of DMD and prove
their convergence. In Section V, we construct several examples of
DMD from each class. We present numerical results in Section VI
and conclusions in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Convex Sets, Fenchel Duality and Monotone Operators
The following is from [23], [25], [28]. Given a convex set C ⊆
Rn, the (relative) interior of the set is denoted as (rint(C)) int(C).
rint(C) coincides with int(C) whenever int(C) is non-empty. The
closure of C is denoted as cl(C), and the relative boundary of C is
defined as rbd(C) = cl(C)\ rint(C). The indicator function over C is
denoted by δC . The normal cone of C is defined as NΩ(x) = {v ∈
Rn|v>(y − x) ≤ 0,∀y ∈ C} and piC(x) = argmin
y∈C
‖y − x‖22 is the
Euclidean projection of x onto C.
Let E = Rn be endowed with norm ‖ · ‖ and inner product 〈·, ·〉.
An extended real-valued function is a function f that maps from E
to [−∞,∞]. The (effective) domain of f is dom(f) = {x ∈ E :
f(x) < ∞}. A function f : E → [−∞,∞] is proper if it does not
attain the value −∞ and there exists at least one x ∈ E such that
f(x) <∞; it is closed if its epigraph is closed. A function f : E→
[−∞,∞] is supercoercive if lim‖x‖→∞ f(x)/‖x‖ → ∞. Let ∂f(x)
denote a subgradient of f at x and ∇f(x) the gradient of f at x, if
f is differentiable. Suppose f is a closed convex proper on E with
int(dom(f)) 6= ∅, then f is essentially smooth if f is differentiable
on int(dom(f)) and lim
k→∞
‖∇f(xk)‖ → ∞ whenever {xk}∞k=1 is
a sequence in int(dom(f)) converging towards a boundary point. f
is essentially strictly convex if f is strictly convex on every convex
subset of dom(∂f). A function f is Legendre if it is both essentially
smooth and essentially strictly convex. Given f , the function f? :
E?→ [−∞,∞] defined by f?(z) = supx∈E
[
x>z−f(x)], is called
the conjugate function of f , where E? is the dual space of E, endowed
with the dual norm ‖ · ‖?. f? is closed and convex if f is proper.
By Fenchel’s inequality, for any x ∈ E, z ∈ E?, f(x)+f?(z)≥z>x
(with equality if and only if z∈∂f(x) for proper and convex f , or x∈
∂f?(z) if in addition f is closed [23, Theorem 4.20]). The Bregman
divergence of a proper, closed, convex function f , differentiable over
dom(∂f), is Df :dom(f)×dom(∂f)→ R, Df (x, y)=f(x)−f(y)−
∇f(y)>(x−y). F :C⊆Rn→Rn is monotone if (F (z)−F (z′))>(z−
z′)≥0, ∀z, z′∈C. F is L-Lipschitz if ‖F (z)−F (z′)‖≤L‖z−z′‖,
for some L > 0 and is β-cocoercive if (F (z)−F (z′)>(z − z′) ≥
β‖F (z)−F (z)′‖2, ∀z, z′∈C for some β>0.
B. N-Player Concave Games
Let G = (N , {Ωp}p∈N , {Up}p∈N ) be a game, where N =
{1, . . . , N} is the set of players, Ωp ⊆ Rnp is the set of player
p’s strategies (actions). We denote the strategy (action) set of player
p’s opponents as Ω−p ⊆ ∏q∈N ,q 6=p Rnq . We denote the set of all
the players strategies as Ω =
∏
p∈N Ω
p ⊆ ∏p∈N Rnp = Rn, n =∑
p∈N np. We refer to Up : Ω → R, x 7→ Up(x) as player p’s
real-valued payoff function, where x = (xp)p∈N ∈ Ω is the action
profile of all players, and xp ∈ Ωp is the action of player p. We also
denote x as x = (xp;x−p) where x−p ∈ Ω−p is the action profile
of all players except p.
Assumption 1. For all p ∈ N ,
i. Ωp is a non-empty, closed, convex, subset of Rnp ,
ii. Up(xp;x−p) is (jointly) continuous in x = (xp;x−p),
iii. Up(xp;x−p) is concave and continuously differentiable in each
xp for all x−p ∈ Ω−p.
Under Assumption 1, we refer to G as a concave game. Equiv-
alently, in terms of a cost function Jp = −Up, the game G is a
convex game. For the rest of the paper, we use the payoff function
throughout. Given x−p ∈ Ωp, each agent p ∈ N aims to find the
solution of the following optimization problem,
maximize
xp
Up(xp;x−p) subject to xp ∈ Ωp. (1)
A profile x?=(xp?)p∈N ∈Ωp is a Nash equilibrium if,
Up(xp?;x−p?) ≥ Up(xp;x−p?), ∀xp ∈ Ωp, ∀p ∈ N . (2)
At a Nash equilibrium, no player can increase his payoff by unilateral
deviation. If Ωp is bounded, under Assumption 1, existence of a
Nash equilibrium is guaranteed (cf., e.g. [27, Theorem 4.4]). When
Ωp is closed but not bounded, existence of a Nash equilibrium is
guaranteed under the additional assumption that −Up is coercive
in xp, that is, lim
‖xp‖→∞
−Up(xp;x−p) = +∞, for all x−p ∈
Ω−p, p ∈ N , (cf. [27, Corollary 4.2]). A useful characterization
of a Nash equilibrium of a concave game G is given in terms of
the pseudo-gradient defined as U : Ω → Rn, U(x) = (Up(x))p∈N ,
where Up(x) = ∇xpUp(xp;x−p) is the partial-gradient. By [28,
Proposition 1.4.2], x? ∈ Ω is a Nash equilibrium if and only if,
(x− x?)>U(x?) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ Ω. (3)
Equivalently x? is a solution of the variational inequality VI(Ω,−U),
[28], or, using the definition of the normal cone,
U(x?) ∈ NΩ(x?). (4)
Standard assumptions on the pseudo-gradient are as follows.
Assumption 2. −U(x) = −(∇xpUp(xp, x−p))p∈N is
(i) monotone, −(U(x)− U(x′))>(x− x′) ≥ 0, ∀x, x′ ∈ Ω.
(ii) strictly monotone, −(U(x)−U(x′))>(x−x′)>0,∀x 6=x′ ∈ Ω.
(iii) η-strongly monotone, −(U(x)−U(x′))>(x−x′) ≥ η‖x−x′‖22,
∀x, x′∈Ω, for some η>0.
(iv) µ-hypo monotone, −(U(x)−U(x′))>(x−x′) ≥ −µ‖x−x′‖22,
∀x, x′∈Ω, for some µ>0.
We refer to G as a monotone game if it satisfies Assumption 2(i).
III. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider a set of players who are repeatedly interacting in a
concave game G. Assume that the game repeats with an infinitesimal
time-step between each stage, hence we model it as a continuous-
time process as in [16], [10]. Each player maps his own partial-
gradient up = Up(x) ∈ Rnp into an auxiliary variable zp ∈ Rnp
via a dynamical system z˙p =F (zp, up) and selects the next action
xp∈Ωp via a so-called mirror map Cp. The entire learning process
for each player can be written as a continuous-time dynamical system,{
z˙p = F (zp, up),
xp = Cp(zp),
(5)
where up = Up(x) = ∇xpUp(xp;x−p). We assume that the mirror
map Cp : Rnp → Ωp is given by,
Cp(zp) = argmax
yp∈Ωp
[
yp
>
zp − ϑp(yp)
]
, (6)
where ϑp : Rnp → Rnp∪{∞} is assumed to be a closed, proper and
(at-least) essentially strictly convex function, where dom(ϑp) = Ωp
is assumed be a non-empty, closed and convex set. The function ϑp is
often referred to as a regularizer in optimization, learning and game
contexts. Different forms of mirror map can be derived depending on
3the regularizer. Finally, since the pseudo-gradient is not assumed to be
bounded, ϑp should be chosen so that the dual space is unconstrained.
The most important family of algorithms that follows the model of
the learning dynamics (5) is that of mirror descent (MD) dynamics,{
z˙p = γup,
xp = Cp(zp),
(7)
where γ > 0 is a rate parameter. This can be interpreted as each
player performing an aggregation of its own partial-gradient, zp(t) =
zp(0)+γ
t∫
0
up(τ)dτ , and mapping it to an action via the mirror map
Cp. The discrete-time analog of (7),{
zpk+1 = z
p
k + γtku
p
k,
xpk+1 = C
p(zpk+1),
(8)
with tk>0 the step-size, is the online mirror descent studied in [13]
in a similar concave game setup. In finite games, this algorithm is
referred to as Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) [24].
Remark 1. As an example, let ϑp(xp)=
1
2
‖xp‖22, dom(ϑp)=Rnp ,
so, cf. (6), Cp(zp) = argmax
yp∈Ωp
[
yp>zp− 1
2
‖xp‖22
]
= zp. The dual
(MD) dynamics (7) is,
z˙p = γup, xp = zp, (9)
which is in turn equivalent to the well-known primal dynamics,
x˙p = γup = γ∇xpUp(xp;x−p), (10)
or the pseudo-gradient dynamics (PSGD), known to converge to the
NE when −U(x) is strictly/strongly monotone (e.g. Lemma 2, [22]).
In this paper we propose a related variant of the MD dynamics
(7), called the discounted mirror descent dynamics DMD, given by,{
z˙p = γ(−zp + up),
xp = Cp(zp), ∀p ∈ N (11)
where up = Up(x) = ∇xpUp(xp;x−p), and γ > 0. Unlike the
undiscounted MD (7), in (11) each player performs an exponentially
discounted aggregation. The DMD dynamics of all players can be
written in stacked notation as,
z˙ = γ(−z + u), x = C(z) (12)
with x∈Ω, z∈Rn,u=U(x)=(Up(x))p∈N ,C(z)=(Cp(zp))p∈N .
Our focus in this paper is to construct classes of DMD dynamics
(11) for different types of the regularizer ϑp, (6). We investigate
the convergence of these classes of dynamics in monotone (not
necessarily strictly monotone) games, based on the properties of the
associated mirror map Cp, (6). We then construct several examples
of DMD dynamics from each class.
IV. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR DESIGNING
DISCOUNTED MIRROR DESCENT DYNAMICS
In this section, we consider two general classes of regularizers and
study properties of the associated mirror maps (proofs are given in the
Appendix). Based on these, we investigate the convergence of DMD
(11), under different assumptions on the game’s pseudo-gradient.
A. Properties of Induced Mirror Maps
We consider convex regularizers that can be classified as either
steep or non-steep according to the following definition.
Definition 1. A closed, proper, convex regularizer ϑp:Rnp→R∪{∞}
is said to be steep (or relatively essentially smooth) if,
(i) dom(ϑp) is non-empty and convex,
(ii) ϑp is differentiable on rint(dom(ϑp)),
(iii) lim
k→∞
‖∇ϑp(xpk)‖= +∞, whenever {xpk}∞k=1 is a sequence in
rint(dom(ϑp)) converging to a point in rbd(dom(ϑp)).
ϑp is non-steep if lim
k→∞
‖∇ϑp(xpk)‖ is bounded, for any sequence
{xpk}∞k=1 in rint(dom(ϑp)) converging to a point in rbd(dom(ϑp)).
Remark 2. A non-empty, convex domain dom(ϑp) ensures the non-
emptiness of its relative interior [25, Theorem 6.2, p. 45].
Proposition 1. Let ϑp :Rnp→R∪{∞} be a closed, proper, convex.
Then, the following hold: (i) If ϑp is steep, then rbd(dom(ϑp)) 6⊂
dom(∂ϑp) and dom(∂ϑp)=rint(dom(ϑp)).
(ii) If ϑp is non-steep, then rbd(dom(ϑp)) ⊂ dom(∂ϑp) and
dom(∂ϑp)=dom(ϑp).
Assumption 3. The regularizer ϑp :Rnp→R∪{∞} is closed, proper,
convex, with dom(ϑp) non-empty, closed and convex. In addition,
(i) ϑp is ρ-strongly convex, or
(ii) ϑp is Legendre and int(dom(ϑp)) 6=∅.
Note that Assumption 3(ii) relaxes strong convexity to essential
strict convexity and essential smoothness (steepness). In order to take
into consideration  in the regularization, cf.(6), we considerψp=ϑp,
which inherits all properties of ϑp. We then refer to Cp as the mirror
map induced by ψp. Next, we derive properties of Cp for the two
classes of regularizers cf. Assumption 3(i) and Assumption 3(ii).
Proposition 2. Let ψp = ϑp,  > 0, where ϑp satisfies Assump-
tion 3(i), and let ψp? be the convex conjugate of ψp. Then,
(i) ψp? :Rnp→R∪{∞} is closed, proper, convex and finite-valued
over Rnp , i.e., dom(ψp?) = Rnp .
(ii) ψp? is continuously differentiable on Rnp and ∇ψp?=Cp.
(iii) Cp is (ρ)−1-Lipschitz on Rnp .
(iv) Cp is ρ-cocoercive on Rnp , and in particular, is monotone.
(v) Cp is surjective from Rnp onto rint(dom(ψp)) whenever ψp is
steep, and onto dom(ψp) whenever ψp is non-steep.
(vi) Cp has ∇ψp as a left-inverse over rint(dom(ψp)) whenever ψp
is steep, and over dom(ψp) whenever ψp is non-steep.
Remark 3. If ψp=ϑp is differentiable over all dom(ψp), following
[33, Theorem 6.2.4(b), p. 264], Proposition 2 strengthens as follows:
(i) ψp? is closed, proper, strictly convex and finite-valued over Rnp,
(ii) Cp is strictly monotone on Rnp , (iii) Cp is bijective from Rnp
to dom(ψp), (iv) Cp has a full inverse ∇ψp over dom(ψp). For
example, ϑp(xp)=
1
2
‖xp‖22, xp∈Rnp , (PSGD) is such a case.
Proposition 3. Let ψp = ϑp,  > 0, where ϑp satisfies Assump-
tion 3(ii), and let ψp? be the convex conjugate of ψp. Then,
(i) ψp? : Rnp → R∪{∞} is closed, proper, Legendre and finite-
valued over Rnp , i.e., dom(ψp?)=Rnp .
(ii) ∇ψp : int(dom(ψp))→ int(dom(ψp?)) is a homeomorphism
with inverse mapping (∇ψp)−1 =∇ψp?=Cp.
(iii) Cp is strictly monotone on int(dom(ψp?)).
Proposition 3 follows from Legendre theorem [25, Thm 26.5, p.258].
Next, we provide a fixed-point characterization of the mirror map
Cp (Proposition 4), which will be used to relate equilibria of (12) to
Nash equilibria of the game (Proposition 5).
Proposition 4. Let ψp=ϑp, >0, where ϑp satisfies Assumption 3.
Then, the mirror map induced by ψp, Cp, (6), can be written as the
fixed point of the Bregman projection,
Cp(zp) = argmin
yp∈Ωp
Dψp(y
p, Cp(zp)), (13)
where Dψp is the Bregman divergence of ψ
p,
Dψp(y
p, qp)=ψp(yp)−ψp(qp)−∇ψp(qp)>(yp−qp).
We show next that any rest point x of DMD (11) or (12) is the
Nash equilibrium associated with a perturbed payoff. Any equilibrium
point of the closed-loop system (12) is characterized by,
u = U(x) = z, x = C(z), (14)
i.e., z =U ◦C(z), x =C ◦ U(x). From (6), by Berge’s maximum
theorem, C is compact valued and upper semicontinuous. Since U is
jointly continuous, U ◦C is also compact and upper semicontinuous,
and by Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem, admits a fixed point.
4Proposition 5. Let ψp= ϑp, >0, where ϑp satisfies Assumption 3
and Cp the induced mirror map. Any rest point x= C(z) of DMD
(11) is the Nash equilibrium of the game G with perturbed payoff,
U˜p(xp;x−p) = Up(xp;x−p)− ϑp(xp). (15)
As →0, x→x?, where x?=(xp?)Np=1 is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. From the fixed-point characterization of the mirror map (13)
(cf. Proposition 4), evaluated at z = u, one can write ∀p,
Cp(up) = argmin
yp∈Rnp
[
δΩp(y
p) +Dψp(y
p, Cp(up))
]
,
where δΩp(y
p) is the indicator function over Ωp. By Fermat’s
condition for unconstrained optimization [30, Prop 27.1, p. 497],
xp = Cp(zp) = Cp(up) is a minimizer if and only if,
0 ∈ ∂δΩp(xp) +∇ypDψp(xp, Cp(up)), (16)
or 0 ∈ NΩp(xp) + ∇ψp(xp) − ∇ψp(Cp(up)), where
∂δΩp(x
p) = NΩp(x
p) [30] was used. By Proposition 2(ii) or
Proposition 3(ii), Cp(up) = ∇ψp?(up), and Cp has ∇ψp as a
left-inverse (cf. Proposition 2(vi) or Proposition 3(ii)), therefore,
∇ψp(Cp(up)) = ∇ψp(∇ψp?(up)) = up. Substituting this and
up=∇xpUp(xp;x−p) yields for any >0, ∀p,
∇xpUp(xp, x−p) ∈ (NΩp +∇ψp)(xp) = (NΩp + ∇ϑp)(xp),
In stacked form, with ∇ϑ(x)=(∇ϑp(xp))p∈N , this is written as
U(x)− ∇ϑ(x) ∈ NΩ(x), (17)
or∇xp U˜p(xp;x−p))Np=1∈NΩ(x). By (4), x is a Nash equilibrium for
the perturbed payoff U˜p. As →0, (17) yields (4), hencex→x?.
Remark 4. If −U is monotone, then −(U(x)− ∇ϑ(x)) is strictly
monotone, hence a unique perturbed NE exists for each >0.
B. Convergence of DMD under Induced Mirror Maps
Using key properties given by Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, for
regularizers satisfying either Assumption 3(i) or Assumption 3(ii),
in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 we show convergence of DMD under
corresponding induced mirror maps in the two cases, respectively.
Theorem 1. Let G = (N , (Ωp)p∈N , (Up)p∈N ) be a concave game
with players’ dynamics given by DMD (11). Assume there are a finite
number of isolated fixed-points z of U ◦ C, where C = (Cp)p∈N is
the mirror map induced by ψp = ϑp satisfying Assumption 3(i).
Then, under either Assumption 2(i), (ii), or (iii), with the additional
assumption that −Up is coercive in xp whenever Ωp is non-compact,
for any >0, the auxiliary variables z(t)=(zp(t))p∈N converge to
a rest point z while players’ actions x(t)=(xp(t))p∈N converge to
x, a perturbed Nash equilibrium of G. Alternatively, under Assump-
tion 2(iv), the same conclusions hold for any >µρ−1.
Proof. Let z be a rest point of (12), z = u = U(C(z)). Take as
Lyapunov function the sum of Bregman divergences of ψp?, V (z)=∑
p∈N Dψp?(z
p, zp),
V (z)=
∑
p∈N
ψp
?
(zp)−ψp?(z¯p)−∇ψp?(zp)>(zp−zp). (18)
Since ψp? is convex (cf. Proposition 2(i)), it follows that V is positive
semidefinite. When Ωp is compact, since Upi (x
p;x−p) is continuous,
|Upi (xp;x−p)| ≤ M,∀x ∈ Ω, for some M > 0. Then from (11),
|zpi(t)|≤e−γt|zpi(0)|+M(1−e−γt), and |zpi (t)|≤max{zpi(0),M},∀t≥
0. Hence D = {z ∈ Rn|‖z‖2 ≤
√
nM} is nonempty, compact,
positively invariant set. Alternatively, when Ωp is non-compact, for
any x¯p∈ int(dom(ψp)), ψp?(·)− < x¯p, · > is coercive [26, Prop.
1.3.9(i)], hence V is coercive and D can be any of its sublevel sets.
Along any solution of (11), V˙ (z) =
∑
p∈N
∇zpDψp?(zp, zp)>z˙p =∑
p∈N
γ(∇ψp?(zp)−∇ψp?(zp))>(up−zp). Using Proposition 2(ii),
V˙ (z) =
∑
p∈N
γ(Cp(zp)− Cp(zp))>(up − up + zp−zp)
= γ(x−x)>(u− u)−γ(C(z)−C(z))>(z−z), (19)
where x=C(z) and x=C(z), cf.(14) was used. Since u=U(x), u=
U(x), under Assumption 2(i), 2(ii), or 2(iii) the first term of V˙ (z)
is non-positive, therefore, V˙ (z) ≤ −γ(C(z) − C(z))>(z − z) ≤
−γ(ρ)‖C(z) − C(z)‖2, where we used the fact that Cp is ρ-
cocoercive (cf. Proposition 2(iv)). This implies that V˙ (z)≤ 0,∀z ∈
Rn and V˙ (z)=0 only if z∈E :={z ∈ D|C(z)=C(z)}. We find the
largest invariant setM contained in E for z˙ = γ(−z+U ◦C(z)). On
E , z˙=γ(−z+z), hence since γ> 0, ‖z(t)−z‖? → 0 as t→∞, for
any z(0)∈E . Thus, no other solution except z can stay forever in E ,
and M consists only of equilibria. Since by assumption there are a
finite number of isolated equilibria, by LaSalle’s invariance principle,
[11], it follows that for any z(0) ∈ D, z(t) converges to one of
them, z. Finally, since Cp is (ρ)−1-Lipschitz (cf. Proposition 2(iii)),
‖x(t)−x‖≤ (ρ)−1‖z(t)−z‖?, hence ‖x(t)− x‖ → 0 as t → ∞,
where, by Proposition 5, x is a perturbed Nash equilibrium.
Alternatively, under Assumption 2(iv), following from (19),
V˙ (z) ≤ γµ‖C(z)− C(z)‖2 − γ(C(z)−C(z))>(z−z)
≤ γµ‖C(z)− C(z)‖2 − γ(ρ)‖C(z)− C(z)‖2
≤ −γ(ρ− µ)‖C(z)− C(z)‖2,
where we again used the ρ-cocoercivity of Cp. Assuming that >
µρ−1, then V˙ (z)≤0, and convergence follows as before.
Theorem 2. Let G = (N , (Ωp)p∈N , (Up)p∈N ) be a concave game
with players’ dynamics given by DMD (11). Assume there are a finite
number of isolated fixed-points z of U ◦ C, where C=(Cp)p∈N is
the mirror map induced by ψp = ϑp satisfying Assumption 3(ii).
Then, under either Assumption 2(i), (ii), or (iii), with the additional
assumption that −Up is coercive in xp whenever Ωp is non-compact,
for any >0, the auxiliary variables z(t)=(zp(t))p∈N converge to
a rest point z while players’ actions x(t)=(xp(t))p∈N converge to
x, a perturbed Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. We use the same Lyapunov function (18). Since under As-
sumption 3(ii), ψp? is Legendre (cf. Proposition 3(i)), ψp? is strictly
convex on int(domψp?), hence V is positive definite at z = z.
Moreover, since ψp? is essentially strictly convex, by [34, Thm
3.7(iii)], Dψp?(·, zp) is coercive, so that V is radially unbounded.
Then along any solution trajectory of (11), using Proposition 3(ii), we
can write as in (19) , V˙ (z)=γ(x−x)>(u−u)−γ(C(z)−C(z))>(z−z).
Since u = U(x), u = U(x), under either Assumption 2(i), 2(ii)
or 2(iii), the first term of V˙ (z) is non-positive, so that, V˙ (z) ≤
−γ(C(z)−C(z))>(z−z). Since C is strictly monotone by Propo-
sition 3(iii), therefore V˙ (z) < 0, ∀z ∈ Rn\{z}, and by Lyapunov
theorem [11, Theorem 4.1, p.114], z is asymptotically stable and
therefore z(t) converges to z,∀z(0)∈Rn. By the continuity of C(z)
(Proposition 3(ii)), it follows that x(t) converges x=C(z), ∀x(0)=
C(z(0)), where x is a perturbed Nash equilibrium.
Remark 5. In general, convergence is to the set of perturbed Nash
equilibria. By Proposition 5, as  → 0, x → x?, where x? is a
Nash equilibrium of G. Under Assumption 2(ii) or 2(iii), the game
admits a unique Nash equilibrium, so x(t) converges towards the
unique x?. Note that in the case of Legendre regularizers, Theorem 2
gives convergence guarantees only for monotone games. On the
other hand, in the case of strongly convex regularizers, Theorem 1
gives guarantees for convergence in hypo-monotone games, based
on cocoercivity of the mirror map. We note that the above results
can be extended to the weighted monotone case, [29], −(U(x) −
U(x′))>Λ(x− x′) ≥ 0,∀x, x′ ∈ Ω, where Λ = diag(λ1, . . . , λN ),
λp > 0, p ∈ N , by appropriately redefining the regularizer.
5V. EXAMPLES OF DMD
We now provide several examples of DMD, whereby the mirror
map is generated by regularizers in one of the two general classes.
The first two are for examples of strongly convex regularizers (non-
steep and steep), and the other three are for Legendre regularizers.
For all derivations, we repeatedly use of the following result, based
on a simple application of [23, Theorem 4.14, p. 92].
Lemma 1. Let ψp=ϑp, >0, where ϑp satisfies Assumption 3, and
let ψp? be the convex conjugate of ψp. Then,
(i) ψp?(zp) = ϑp?(−1zp),
(ii) Cp(zp) = ∇ψp?(zp) = ∇ϑp?(−1zp), zp ∈ Rnp ,
where ϑp? is the convex conjugate of ϑp.
Example 1. Euclidean Regularization over Compact Sets
Let Ωp ⊂ Rnp be nonempty, compact and convex and consider,
ϑp(xp) =
1
2
‖xp‖22 + δΩp(xp). (20)
By inspection, ϑp is supercoercive, 1-strongly convex (Assump-
tion 3(i)) and non-steep, hence, ψp=ϑp inherits the same properties
over Ωp=dom(ψp). The convex conjugate ψp? is given by,
ψp
?
(zp) =

2
(‖−1zp‖22 − ‖−1zp − piΩp(−1zp)‖22), (21)
where piΩp is the Euclidean projection on Ω
p. By Proposition 2(ii),
ψp? is continuously differentiable on Rnp and can be shown to have a
gradient ∇ψp?(z) = Cp(zp) = piΩp(−1zp). By Proposition 2(iii),
(iv), (v), (vi), Cp(z) is −1-Lipschitz, -cocoercive, surjective from
Rnp onto Ωp and has a left-inverse on Ωp given by ∇ψp(xp) = xp.
Then the DMD corresponding to (11), (20) is given by,{
z˙p = γ(−zp + up),
xp = Cp(zp) = piΩp(
−1zp),
(22)
which we refer to as the projected DMD (or PDMD). By Theorem 1,
PDMD (22) is guaranteed to converge to x, a perturbed Nash
equilibrium in any monotone game G = (N , (Ωp)p∈N , (Up)p∈N ),
for any  > 0, and in any µ hypo-monotone game, for any  > µ.
Remark 6. (22) can be viewed as the continuous-time dual counter-
part to the Tikhonov (primal) regularization algorithm in [19].
Example 2. Entropy Regularization over the Unit Simplex
Let Ωp= {xp∈Rnp |xpi ≥ 0,
np∑
i=1
xpi = 1} :=∆p and
ϑp(xp) =
np∑
i=1
xpi log(x
p
i ). (23)
with the convention 0log 0 = 0. It can be shown that ϑp is
supercoercive, 1-strongly convex over ∆p with respect to ‖ · ‖1
(Assumption 3(i))) and steep. Hence ψp = ϑp inherits the same
properties. Then ψp?(zp)= log(
np∑
i=1
exp(−1zp)), and
∇ψp?(zp)=Cp(zp)=
 exp(−1z
p
i )
np∑
j=1
exp(−1zpj )

i∈{1,...,np}
(24)
By Proposition 2(iii), (iv), (v), (vi), Cp(zp) is −1-Lipschitz with
respect to ‖·‖∞, -cocoercive, surjective from Rnp onto rint(∆p) and
has a left-inverse on rint(∆p) given by ∇ψp(xp) = (log(xp)+1).
Then the DMD corresponding to (23) is given by (11), (24), and by
Theorem 1, is guaranteed to converge to a perturbed NE in any mono-
tone game G=(N ,(∆p)p∈N ,(Up)p∈N ), for any >0, and in any µ
hypo-monotone game, for any >µ. This dynamics corresponds to
the exponentially-discounted reinforcement learning dynamics (EXP-
D-RL) for finite games studied in [7]. There are several other well-
known entropies over the simplex ∆p which are steep, e.g. the log-
barrier or the Burg entropy, ϑp(x) = − ∑
i=1
log(xpi ), [6]. Undis-
counted dynamics were shown to converge in games with a strict
NE, [6], but not in zero-sum games with an interior NE. According
to Theorem 1, the discounted DMD dynamics corresponding to these
entropies are in fact guaranteed to converge in monotone games.
Example 3. Entropy Regularization over Non-Negative Orthant
Let Ωp=Rnp≥0 and consider the Boltzmann-Shannon entropy
ϑp(xp)=
np∑
j=1
[
xpj log(x
p
j )−xpj
]
, (25)
with the convention 0 log 0 = 0. It can be shown that ϑp is
supercoercive and Legendre [34] (Assumption 3(ii)), hence ψp=ϑp
is too. The dual map ψp? :Rnp → R∪{∞} is given by,
ψp
?
(zp)=
np∑
i=1
exp(−1zpi ), and C
p(zp)=exp(−1zp), (26)
which is strictly monotone over int(Rnp≥0). Then the DMD corre-
sponding to (25) is given by (11), with Cp, (26), which we refer to
as the Boltzmann-Shannon DMD (or BDMD). By Theorem 2, BDMD
is guaranteed to converge to x, a perturbed Nash equilibrium in any
monotone game G = (N ,(Rnp≥0)p∈N , (Up)p∈N ), for any  > 0. The
BDMD can be generalized to Ωp=[−cp,∞]np , cp≥0 and the mirror
map is given by Cp(zp)=exp(−1zp)−cp1.
Example 4. Entropy Regularization over Unit Square
Let Ωp = [0, 1]np and consider the Fermi-dirac entropy
ϑp(xp) =
np∑
j=1
[
(xpj ) log(x
p
j )+(1− xpj ) log(1− xpj )
]
, (27)
which can be shown to be supercoercive and Legendre [34] (Assump-
tion 3(ii)), hence ψp = ϑp is supercoercive and Legendre as well.
The dual map ψp? : Rnp → R ∪ {∞} is given by,
ψp
?
(zp) = 
np∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−1zpi )), (28)
sometimes referred to as the softplus function. The mirror map is
Cp(zp) =
[
exp(−1zpi )
1 + exp(−1zpi )
]
i∈{1,...,np}
(29)
It can be shown that Cp is strictly monotone over int([0, 1]np)
with inverse ∇ψp(xp) = ( log(xpj/(1 − xpj )))
np
j=1. The associated
DMD is given by (11), (29), which we refer to as the Fermi-
Dirac regularized (FDMD). By Theorem 2, FDMD (11), (29), is
guaranteed to converge to a perturbed NE in any monotone game
G = (N , ([0, 1]np)p∈N , (Up)p∈N ), for any  > 0. The FDMD can
be generalized to Ωp=[ap,bp]np , by appropriately modifying it.
Example 5. Regularization over Euclidean Spheres
Assume that Ωp = {xp ∈ Rnp |‖xp− cp‖2 ≤ ap} := Bnpap (cp).
Consider the Hellinger distance, ϑp(xp) = −
√
ap2 − ‖xp − cp‖22,
which can be shown to be supercoercive and Legendre [34]. Hence
ψp=ϑp is supercoercive and Legendre as well (Assumption 3(ii)).
The dual map is ψp?(zp) = (ap
√
1 + ‖−1zp‖22 − −1cp>z) and
the mirror map is given by,
Cp(zp) =
ap−1zp√
1 + ‖−1zp‖22
− cp1, (30)
strictly monotone over Rnp . The associated DMD given by (11),
(30), which we refer to as the Hellinger regularized DMD (HDMD),
6Name and Acronym Dynamics Mirror Map Player Action Set
Projected Discounted MD (PDMD) z˙p = γ(−zp + up) xp = piΩp(−1zp) Ωp
Exponentially-Discounted RL
(EXPD-RL)
xp =
 exp(−1z
p
i )
np∑
j=1
exp(−1zpj )

i∈{1,...,np}
∆p
Boltzmann-Shannon Regularized
DMD (BDMD)
xp = exp(−1zp)− cp1 [−cp,∞]np
Fermi-Dirac Regularized DMD
(FDMD)
xp =
[
ap+bp exp(−1zpi )
exp(−1zpi ) + 1
]
i∈{1,...,np}
[ap, bp]np
Hellinger Regularized DMD (HDMD) xp = ap−1zp
[√
1 + ‖−1zp‖22
]−1
− cp1 Bnpap (cp)
TABLE 1: Discounted Mirror Descent Dynamics
is guaranteed to converge to a perturbed NE in any monotone game
G=(N , (Bnpap (cp))p∈N , (Up)p∈N ), for any >0, cf. Theorem 2.
We summarize all these discounted dynamics in Table 1. Note that
the undiscounted versions of these dynamics are given by (7) with
the corresponding mirror maps.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulations results. We note that an
example of resource sharing via Kelly’s mechanism [36] in a strictly
monotone game for N=4 players is provided in [39]. Here consider
representative examples of monotone and hypo-monotone games.
For comparison purposes, all dynamics are simulated over the same
duration, and unless otherwise specified, with the same  and γ=1,
for initial value z(0)=0. For PDMD (22) and FDMD we assume
that each player’s strategy is projected onto [−100,100] (or Cartesian
product of it) whenever the action set is unconstrained, and onto
[0,100] whenever the action set is a subset of the non-negative orthant.
For HDMD, we used the ball of radius 100 centered at origin. The
color code for each dynamics is as follows: PDMD (22) (blue),
BDMD (red), FDMD (orange), HDMD (magenta).
Example 1. (Monotone and Hypo-monotone Quadratic Games)
In this example we compare the discounted DMDs in a monotone
quadratic and a hypo-monotone quadratic game. For the monotone
game, we also compare them with the discrete-one introduced in
[18], [19]. Quadratic games constitute an important class of games
that serve as second-order approximation to other nonlinear payoff
functions and models of competition between markets [27, p. 190].
Consider an N player game where each player p has a quadratic
payoff function, Up(xp;x−p)= 1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
xi
>
Apijx
j+
N∑
i=1
bpi x
i+cp,
where xp ∈ Rnp and Apij=Apji
>∈Rnp×np , with each Apii being
symmetric and bpi∈Rnp , cp∈R. Let Ap ∈ Rn×n be the block matrix,
Ap=(Apij), and b
p=[bp1 . . . b
p
N ]
>∈Rn, we can write Up(xp;x−p)=
1
2
x>Apx+bp>x+cp. The pseudo-gradient of this game is
U(x) = Rx+ b, (31)
where R =
A
1
11 . . . A
1
1N
...
. . .
...
ANN1 . . . A
N
NN
. Then the game is monotone (cf.
Assumption 2(i) if for all x, x′∈Rn, −(U(x)−U(x′))>(x− x′)=
−(x−x′)>R(x− x′)≥0, i.e., if R+R> is negative semidefinite.
Consider N = 2, xp ∈ R, A1 =
[−10 10
5 −5
]
, A2 =
[−5 5
10 −10
]
,
b1 = 500, b2 =−500, c1 = 0, c2 = 0. The pseudo-gradient U(x) is
(31) where R=
[−10 10
10 −10
]
, b=
[
500 −500]>. R has eigenvalues
{−20, 0}, hence the game is monotone. The set of Nash equilibria
is x? ∈ {(x1,x2) ∈ R2|x1 =50+x2}, set indicated with a green
line in Figure 1. In Figure 1, we provide simulations of PDMD,
BDMD, FDMD and HDMD, all for  = 0.5, in (x1, x2) plane. In
order to distinguish between trajectories, each dynamics is simulated
with a different initial z(0). We observe that each of the dynamics
PDMD, FDMD and HDMD converges close to (25,−25) (a NE),
while BDMD converges close to (50,0) (also a NE).
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Fig. 1: Monotone game, =0.5
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Fig. 2: Hypo-monotone game,
=5.1
Consider now A1 =
[−10 15
15 −5
]
, A2 =
[−5 15
15 −10
]
, so that
the pseudo-gradient, (31), has R=
[−10 15
15 −10
]
, with eigenvalues
{−25, 5}. By Assumption 2(iv), the game is hypo-monotone (µ=5),
and x? = (20,−20). We note that only the PDMD is guaranteed to
converge to a perturbed NE (cf. Theorem 1), for >5. In Figure 2 we
provide simulations of the DMDs for =5.1, which show that PDMD
converges to (x1, x2)=(16.4,−16.7) as per Theorem 1 (relatively
close to x? (green star)), while the other dynamics fail to converge.
Remark 7. We compare the discretization of PDMD (22) to the
(coordinated) iterative Tikhonov regularization (ITR) scheme [19],
xpk+1 = piΩp(x
p
k − tk(−Up(xk) + kxpk)), (32)
where, tk and k are sequences of diminishing step-size. By [18,
Theorem 2], ITR converge to the least-norm solution of VI(Ω,−U)
(in the sense of [28, p. 1128]) for monotone games (−U is monotone)
with Lipschitz pseudo-gradient map when the tk, k are appropriately
chosen [18, Lemma 4]. We compare ITR to the discrete-time PDMD
obtained by an Euler discretization of (22),
7{
zpk+1 = z
p
k + tk(−zpk + Up(xk)),
xpk+1 = piΩp(
−1zpk+1),
(33)
where we use tk = 0.001 and  = 0.1. We run this for the monotone
game considered before and we also run ITR with tk = k
−0.48, k =
k−0.51 (as in [19]). The evolution of xpk under PDMD and ITR is
shown in Figure 3, with ITR shown in orange and PDMD shown in
blue (solid line one player, dashed line the other one). Both converge
close to the NE at x? = (25,−25), but we find for all the step-sizes,
PDMD has a faster rate of convergence as compared to ITR.
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Fig. 3: Comparison between discrete-time PDMD and ITR
Example 2. (Learning the Mean of a Distribution)
In this example we compare discounted DMDs with their undis-
counted versions, applied to learning the mean of a distribution,
formulated as a monotone game. Let Z∼ P(z) and X∼Q(x) be
two random variables. We wish to construct a function Gθ :Rn→
Rn, parameterized by an unknown parameter θ ∈ Rn, such that
E(Gθ(Z)) = E(X). The authors of [35] showed that Gθ can be
constructed by solving the saddle point problem 1,
min
θ∈Rn
max
w∈Rn
EX∼Q(x)(Dw(X))− EZ∼P(z)(Dw(Gθ(Z))) (34)
where Dw :Rn→R is a function parametrized by unknown parameter
w ∈Rn. As an example, let Z∼N (0, 1), X∼N (v, 1) (Gaussian
distributions), v=E(X)∈R, Dw(X) = w>X and Gθ(Z) =Z + θ,
for θ, w ∈R. Then the objective in (34) is given by, EX(Dw(X))−
EZ(Dw(Gθ(Z))) = w>EX(X)−w>EZ(Z+θ) = w>(v−θ). With
x1 = θ, x2 = w, (34) is equivalent to a two-player zero-sum game
with
U1(x1;x2) = −x2>(v−x1) U2(x2;x1) = x2>(v−x1) (35)
where the player sets are Ω1 = R,Ω2 = R. The pseudo-gradient is
U(x)=R
[
x1
x2
]
+
[
0
v
]
, R=
[
0 1
−1 0
]
, hence the game is monotone,
and has NE x? = (v,0). Let v = 50. In Figure 4, we show results
for the discounted dynamics (solid), as well as for their undiscounted
counterparts (dashed), for = 0.1. We slightly increased the solver
step-size for FDMD and HDMD in order to distinguish trajectories.
As seen, all discounted DMD dynamics converge to the NE x?
(shown by a green star), whereas the undiscounted dynamics cycle.
Example 3. (Polynomial Regression)
In this example we compare the various DMD dynamics for a
polynomial regression problem formulated as a zero-sum monotone
game. Consider a data set D={(an, bn)}Nn=1, an ∈ R, bn ∈ R and
p(a) = w0 + w1a+ w2a
2 + . . .wMa
M, (36)
where the coefficients w = (w0,w1, . . . ,wM) ∈ RM+1 are to be
found for the best M -order fit through the data D, a ∈ {a1, . . . , aN}.
These coefficients can be found by solving min
w∈RM+1
1
2
‖Aw − b‖22,
1This is an example of the so-called Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN), specifically, the Wasserstein GAN (without Lipschitz constraint).
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Fig. 4: Learning the Mean,  = 0.1
where A ∈ RN×M+1, A =

1 a1 a
2
1 . . . a
M
1
...
...
...
...
1 aN a
2
N . . . a
M
N
 , b =
b1...
bN
 .
Assume ran(A)=RN, then the objective function can be rewritten as
1
2
‖Aw− b‖22 = max
z∈RN
z>(Aw−b)−1
2
‖z‖22 :=max
z∈RN
f(w, z), [37], [38],
and min
w∈RM+1
1
2
‖Aw− b‖22 = min
w∈RM+1
max
z∈RN
f(w, z). With x1 =w∈
RM+1, x2 = z ∈ RN, we obtain a two-player zero-sum game with
payoff functions U1(x1;x2)=−f(x1, x2), U2(x2;x1)=f(x1, x2).
The pseudo-gradient is U(x) =R
[
x1
x2
]
−
[
0
b
]
, for R=
[
∅ −A>
A −I
]
.
Since R + R> =
[
∅ ∅
∅ −2I
]
is negative semidefinite, the game is
monotone. U(x?) = 0 yields x?2 ∈ ker(A>), Ax?1−x?2−b = 0,
hence x?1 = (A>A)−1A>b. Consider a data set with N = 20
points, D = {(1, 20),(2, 12),(3, 15), . . . ,(18,−10),(19, 20),(20, 2)}
and M=3 (fit to a third-order polynomial). The optimal coefficients
are x?1 =(36.0640,−13.0372,1.2084,−0.0342). Figure 5 shows x1
trajectories under PDMD, FDMD and HDMD, all with  = 0.1,
as well as PSGD, with x?1 as green stars. We see that FDMD
and HDMD converge to x?, while PDMD is very slow. The third-
order polynomial associated with the final coefficients found by each
dynamics, along with the best fit are shown in Figure 6 (data points as
red circles), indicating superior performance of FDMD and HDMD.
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Fig. 6: Final third-order fit
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed two continuous-time classes of mirror
dynamics for monotone concave games. We showed that they are
guaranteed to converge to a perturbed Nash equilibrium, which tends
to a Nash equilibrium of the game as the regularization goes to zero.
8One the two classes allows convergence in hypo-monotone games.
We provided several examples from both classes. As future work, we
will consider incomplete information, where players observe only a
portion of the partial-gradient or a noisy version of it.
APPENDIXProof. of Proposition 1
(i) Suppose that dom(ϑp) ⊂ Rnp has dimension nk < np,
then there exists a one-to-one affine transformation T (x) =
Mx+ b, M : Rnp → Rnp linear, of Rnp onto itself
which maps aff(dom(ϑp)) onto the subspace L = {xp =
(xp1, . . . , x
p
nk , x
p
nk+1
, . . . xpnp)|xpnk+1 = 0, . . . , x
p
np = 0}
[25, p. 45]. Then T (dom(ϑp)) ⊂ T (aff(dom(ϑp))) = L.
Since the subspace L is homeomorphic to Rnk , therefore
int(T (dom(ϑp))) is non-empty when regarded as a subset of
Rnk . Then the result follows by applying Theorem 26.1 of [25,
p. 251] to ϑ˜p(xp1, . . . , x
p
nk ) = ϑ
p(xp1, . . . , x
p
nk , 0, . . . , 0), the
restriction of ϑp to L. Otherwise if the dimension of dom(ϑp)
is np, then the interior coincides with the relative interior, the
result again follows from Theorem 26.1 of [25, p. 251].
(ii) rbd(dom(ϑp) ⊂ dom(∂ϑp) follows from the definition. By
[25, p. 227], rint(dom(ϑp)) ⊆ dom(∂ϑp) ⊆ dom(ϑp).
Since rint(dom(ϑp))∩rbd(dom(ϑp)) = ∅, rint(dom(ϑp))∪
rbd(dom(ϑp))=cl(dom(ϑp)), then cl(dom(ϑp))⊆dom(∂ϑp),
hence dom(ϑp)⊆dom(∂ϑp), which shows the reverse.
Proof. of Proposition 2
(i) ψp? is closed, proper, convex follows from [23, Theorem 4.4,
p. 87], [23, Theorem 4.5, p. 88]. Since ψp is closed, proper, ρ-
strongly convex, therefore it is supercoercive [33, Prop 3.10.8,
p. 169], hence ψp? is finite for all zp∈Rnp .
(ii) The continuous differentiablility of ψp? follows from [33,
Theorem 6.2.4(a), p. 264]. Since ψp is strongly convex and
supercoercive, therefore the maximizer of (6) exists, is unique
and equals to ∇ψp? for all zp ∈ Rnp , hence Cp=∇ψp?.
(iii) Since ψp is closed, proper, ρ-strongly convex, the Lipschitzness
of Cp follows from [23, Theorem 5.26, p. 123].
(iv) Since Cp = ∇ψp? and Cp is (ρ)−1-Lipschitz by (iii), ρ-
cocoercivity follows from the Baillon-Haddad theorem, see [30,
Corollary 18.17, p. 323], and monotonicity directly follows.
(v) Since ψp? is proper, closed and convex, by [23, Theorem
4.20, p. 104], ∂ψp? is an inverse of ∂ψp and vice-versa, i.e.,
xp∈∂ψp?(zp) if and only if zp∈∂ψp(xp). Since ∂ψp?(zp)=
{∇ψp?(zp)},∀zp ∈ Rnp , then xp = ∇ψp?(zp). Let xp be
such that ∂ψp(xp) 6= ∅, then the set of all such xp is the
domain of ∂ψp, hence ran(∂ψp?)=ran(∇ψp?)=ran(Cp) ⊆
dom(∂ψp). By a similar argument, dom(∂ψp)⊆ran(Cp), so
Cp is surjective from Rnp onto dom(∂ψp). If ψp is steep, by
Proposition 1, dom(∂ψp)=rint(dom(ψp)), hence ran(Cp)=
rint(dom(ψp)). Otherwise, if ψp is non-steep, by Proposition 1,
dom(∂ψp)=dom(ψp), hence ran(Cp)=dom(ψp).
(vi) From (v), since xp∈∂ψp?(zp) if and only if zp∈∂ψp(xp), and
xp=∇ψp?(zp) =Cp(zp), therefore zp∈∂ψp(Cp(zp)). By (v),
Cp(zp)∈dom(∂ψp), hence ∂ψp is a singleton, ∂ψp={∇ψp},
so that zp=∇ψp(Cp(zp)), i.e. ∇ψp is a left-inverse of Cp.
Proof. of Proposition 4 Consider the argmax characterization (6)
for ψp(yp)=ϑp(yp). Thus, Cp(zp)=argmin
yp∈Ωp
[
ψp(yp)−zp>yp
]
=
argmin
yp∈Ωp
[
ψp(yp)−ψp(∇ψp?(zp))−zp>(yp−∇ψp?(zp))
]
, by in-
serting terms independent of yp. Under Assumption 3(i), by Propo-
sition 2(v), ∇ψp is a left-inverse of ∇ψp? over ran(Cp) =
rint(dom(ψp)) if ψp is steep, and over dom(ψp)=Ωp if ψp is non-
steep. Alternatively, under Assumption 3(ii), by Proposition 3,∇ψp is
inverse of ∇ψp? over ran(Cp)=int(dom(ψp))=int(Ωp). Therefore,
zp=∇ψp(∇ψp?(zp)), which used in the last term yields the Bregman
divergence of ψp.
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